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Abstract
Patent pools are cooperative agreements between several patent owners to bundle the sale
of their respective licenses. In this paper we analyze their consequences on the speed of the
innovation process. We adopt an ex ante perspective and study the impact of possible pool
formation on the incentives to innovate. Because participation in the creation of a pool acts as a
bonus reward on R&D activity, we show that a firm’s investment pattern is upward sloping over
time before pool formation. The smaller the set of initial contributors, the higher this eﬀect. A
pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptance/refusal by the
competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations. It also leads a forward
looking regulator to delay the clearance date of the pool. This may result in a pool size that is
suboptimal from an ex ante viewpoint.
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1 Introduction
Patent pools are cooperative agreements among several patent owners to license in a package
a group of their respective patents to third parties.1 Although patent pools have long been
suspected of facilitating the implementation of anti-competitive behavior, recent communica-
tions by competition authorities recognize the potential virtues of patent pools as a means of
improving social welfare. In the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(1995), patent pools are declared to “provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complemen-
tary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly in-
fringement litigation” (p. 28). In substance, by allowing one-stop shopping, the pool gives access
to more eﬃcient licensing. It can thus increase the private value of the constitutive patents, and
also increase social welfare by facilitating the diﬀusion of innovations. As a consequence of this
more favorable position, patent pools re-emerged in the recent years, mainly in high-technology
sectors. Examples include MPEG-2 Digital Video (1997), DVD-ROM and DVD-Video (1998,
1999), and 3G-Mobile Communications (2001). They participate in the diﬀusion of products
and services which are a growing part of everyday life.
We identify two possible research viewpoints on questions concerning patent pooling, namely
the ex ante perspective and the ex post perspective.
We adopt the ex ante perspective to identify the basic trade-oﬀs that determine the dynamic
incentives to perform R&D. Our starting point is that it would be unrealistic to consider that
1The U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), issued jointly by the Depart-
ment of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), evoke cross-licensing and pooling arrangements,
indistinguishably, as “agreements of two or more owners of diﬀerent items of intellectual property to license one
another or third parties” (p. 28). In more precise terms, in an address before the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, Klein (1997) defines cross-licensing as “an interchange of intellectual property rights between
two or more persons”, and patent pools as “an aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject
of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, such
as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool” (p. 2, ftn 3). This distinction between
cross-licensing agreements and patent pools also appears in Shapiro (2001).
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firms first invest in risky and unrelated R&D projects, and then in case of success consider the
possibility to form a pool with other patent holders. We rather choose to investigate the case in
which firms do anticipate the possibility of participating in a patent pool when they contemplate
investing in a R&D program, and therefore attempt to patent in clearly identified technological
domains toward this aim.2 Indeed, as the pooling of patents allows firms to coordinate their
licensing behavior, it increases their return on investment. This must have an impact on their
investment decisions, provided firms are rational enough to foresee the formation of the pool.
Although legal scholars and business practitioners have documented particularities of all
kinds in clinical analyzes of patent pools, a few stylized features characterize recent arrange-
ments:3 (i) they form at the issue of a voluntary process in which patentees request a clearance
statement from the regulator by submitting a pool proposal;4 (ii) they establish a mechanism
for dividing among patentees the royalty stream;5 (iii) they evolve over time to incorporate the
innovations that are patented after pool creation.6
We develop a tractable dynamic model of pool formation that incorporates these features
and study some of the consequences of the pool formation mechanism on the speed of innovation.
By contrast, the ex post perspective follows antitrust practices for reviewing the impact of
2 In other words, in our model we formalize the well known claim by business observers that innovative activities
“finalized in quite precise directions”, in the words of Dosi (1988, p. 1127).
3See Merges (1999) for a detailed description of the many organizational forms and contractual provisions of
past and current pooling arrangements.
4On this see the four U.S. Department of Justice Business Review Letters (1997, 1998, 1999 and 2002, available
at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm) regarding MPEG-2, the two DVD pools, and the 3G platform,
respectively.
5For example, in the MPEG-2 case, the pool initiators licensed their patents to MPEG LA, a licensing agent.
This separate entity oﬀers the portfolio of patents as a package to third parties (although any particular patent
may be licensed from a pool member individually). Royalties are then distributed according to a formula which
reflects the respective weight of patent contributors to the pool. On this see Merges (1999, p. 28-31).
6The United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (2000) documents the fact that, in recent cases, the Depart-
ment of Justice has not only focused on the complementary nature of existing patents to be licensed at the date
of pool formation, but also required that participants license to each other complementary patents “they obtain
in the future” (p. 7, original emphasis). Moreover, new patents in the pool do not necessarily originate from the
pool initiators. For example, after 1997, the MPEG-2 pool grew by including additional patents from a set of
firms which did not participate in the foundation of the pool, including France Telecom, Hitachi, and JVC.
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a pool on welfare after the formation of that pool. The objective is then to identify what kind
of pools should be authorized by the regulator, a question that is examined by Shapiro (2001).
In this pioneering contribution, a very simple model lends theoretical support to the prevalent
view that welfare is harmed when patents are perfect substitutes, and raised when patents are
perfect complements. However, it is not always obvious that given patents are substitutes or
complements. In that case, a relevant objective is to provide the regulator with some means
to discriminate among pool candidates. Lerner and Tirole (2004) address this problem in a
model that describes the full range between the extreme cases of perfectly substitutable and
perfectly complementary patents. In this more general context, they notably show that the
requirement that independent licenses be oﬀered by pool members to third parties can be used as
a screening device. The reason is roughly that independent licensing is innocuous when patents
are complements, but reduces the pool’s profits when patents are substitutes. Compulsory
independent licensing thus lowers the incentive to pooling substitutable patents.7 In a companion
paper, Lerner, Strojwas, and Tirole (2005) obtain empirical findings that are consistent with
this theoretical result.
In other words, the problem of interest in the ex post perspective is to assess the potential
impact of a proposed arrangement among patent holders on the functioning of the market in
subsequent periods. The objective is to clear pools that will not raise more antitrust concerns
than in the absence of pool. By contrast, what is at stake in the ex ante perspective is the
magnitude of firms’ incentives to invest in R&D as enhanced by the looming possibility to
participate in the formation of a pool.
We believe that an ex ante perspective for analyzing patent pools is important because
7Brenner (2004) extends the Lerner-Tirole setup to include a static (i.e., post innovation) modelling of the
non-cooperative process of pool formation.
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it takes into account the specific nature of the patents they include. Unlike standard goods,
patents exist for their incentive properties. Every manipulation of the value of patents has an
impact on these properties and may change substantially the usefulness of patents as a means
to encourage R&D. In our analysis, we evacuate the antitrust concerns of all kinds by assuming
that potential requirements by the antitrust authority are satisfied. In particular, we rule out
substitutable patents, we assume that pool members may license their inventions separately,
and that new patents may integrate the pool.8 We also limit the potential strategic externalities
to concentrate on the profits enhancing property of pools. The value of a patent in a pool is
supposed not to depend on the size of the pool. Similarly, the value of a patent outside the
pool is supposed not to depend on the existence nor on the size of the pool. This allows us to
analyze the impact of the formation of a pool, as well as the impact of the date of formation of
this pool, on the speed of innovation.
We find that, compared to the situation where there is no possible pooling, the perspective
of a pool enhances the speed of R&D. More interestingly, we show that because firms value more
being among the initial contributors to the pool — as opposed to innovating after the formation
of the pool and then negotiating entry — the equilibrium pattern of innovative eﬀorts is upward
sloping before the formation of the pool. Eventually, we study the impact of the timing of the
regulator’s review process of patent proposals on the level of R&D eﬀorts and resulting welfare.
We find that this process may induce overinvestment in early innovations from the industry’s
viewpoint. It may also induce ineﬃciencies according to a social welfare criterion. This is
because a forward looking regulator is shown to have an incentive to postpone a previously
8These features were identified by considering four recent Departement of Justice Business Review Letters,
that reveal antitrust enforcement intentions with respect to the formation of particular arrangements, namely the
MPEG and two DVD pools in the information technology industry, and the 3G partnership in the mobile phone
industry. The letters are responses to pool initiators which request a statement of the Department of Justice’s
antitrust enforcement intentions.
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announced date of pool formation, a time inconsistency result.
Our analysis of patent pooling bears some resemblance with the standard literature on the
ex ante study of patenting as exemplified by Reinganum (1989) or Grossman and Shapiro (1987)
for instance. In both settings, incentives to innovate are provided by a “prize” in case of success.
However, whereas the monopoly power associated to a patent is costly to the regulator, the
formation of a patent pool can be beneficial even from a purely ex post viewpoint because it
facilitates the diﬀusion of the innovations. This diﬀerence has some consequences for welfare
analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a model of pool formation in the terms of a
diﬀerential game. Section 3 oﬀers a characterization of the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria
of the game. Section 4 is an analysis of the impact of the size of the pool on the incentives
to invest in R&D and on the speed of innovation. Section 5 compares the equilibrium R&D
investment choices with joint profit-maximizing levels and discusses the welfare implications of
the pool review process. Section 6 is a conclusion. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Patent Race Game
We consider an industry of N symmetric firms. Each of them can obtain exactly one innovation
by investing in a specific R&D program. Each innovation is “essential”, in the sense that it has
no substitute. When it innovates, a firm is granted a patent of infinite length and thereby can
secure a given flow of profits v (say, by licensing the innovation), which does not depend on the
existence of other patents nor on their inclusion in a pool. Investment in an R&D program is
a continuous time profit-maximization decision problem. At each point in time, each firm i can
decide independently to exert a non-negative R&D eﬀort xit at some flow cost c(x
i
t), which is such
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that c(0) = 0, c0(xit) ≥ 0, and c00(xit) > 0. We also assume that c0(0) = 0 and c0(+∞) = +∞,
for a firm’s optimal choice of eﬀort to be an interior solution of the corresponding program.9
Innovation is described by a Poisson process and xit is normalized to be firm i’s instantaneous
probability of success.10 Our formulation of the patent race game is thus a particular case of
Reinganum (1981).
We denote by K ≤ N the minimal number of patents necessary to constitute a pool. Here
K describes firms’ anticipations on the pool formation process when they choose a level of eﬀort
in a risky R&D program. In a more complex setting that would model the interaction between
firms and antitrust authorities, K would be determined in equilibrium.11 In the present model,
we simply consider K as a non-stochastic parameter which is identical for all firms. In addition,
we assume that firms’ anticipations are correct, in the sense that the pool is eﬀectively formed
when K innovations are available.
Patent pooling is a cooperative agreement, which establishes the rules according to which
pool profits are shared among individual firms. We assume that, once the pool is created, all
resulting profits are shared equally among pool initiators. If the marginal contribution of each
innovation to the aggregate pool value is constant (i.e., no patent is “better” than others),
the equal sharing of profits assumption implies that all patents in the pool generate a flow of
profits, we denote by v¯, which does not depend on the pool size.12 However, as we shall see,
9The specification that firms incur a variable cost in the R&D technology is as in Lee and Wilde (1980).
However, we consider the possibility that firms instantaneously adjust their rate of eﬀort xit.
10The Poisson assumption implies that there is no accumulation of knowledge, see Reinganum (1989).
11Modelling the interaction between the regulator and the firm would require to deal with the rather complex
issue of out-of-equilibrium beliefs of firms, i.e. the beliefs hold by the firms about K if they observe an unexpected
action of the regulator. To study our problem and obtain the main results, there is no need to introduce such
complications.
12 It is not clear that a more realistic specification would be to have a patent value that increases with pool size.
Indeed there might be some threshold eﬀects, so that the marginal contribution of a new patent to the pool value
increases until the pool reaches a given size, and decreases afterwards. Our working assumption that the value
of patents in the pool is a constant v¯ is thus reasonable as it facilitates computations without contradicting any
kind of prima facie empirical evidence.
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the actualized value of participating in a pool does depend on N and K. The fact that a pool
increases the private value of patents (say, because it coordinates the diﬀusion of a standard) is
reflected by the inequality
v¯ > v. (1)
As Scotchmer (2004) puts it, “[p]rospective inventors face diﬀerent rewards if their intellec-
tual property goes into a patent pool than if they license individually” (p. 178). In addition, an
important qualitative feature we want to capture is the fact that a patentee would rather be in
the set of pool initiators than become an incremental contributor obliged to negotiate its entry
in an existing pool. Therefore we assume that the pool initiators have full bargaining power
when they deal with potential entrants.13 As the established pool cannot commit to reward new
inventors more than their reservation profits, a firm that contemplates integrating it can only
expect a flow of profits v from the patent it holds.
These simplifying assumptions are made to keep the model tractable and nevertheless allow
us to study the dynamic incentives to perform R&D. To do that, in the following paragraphs we
first examine the no-pool benchmark case. Then we establish the actualized value of the patents
owned by the pool initiators and by outsiders, before describing a recursive formulation of the
race to pool creation.
The No-Pool Benchmark Case Suppose that no patent pool may be formed. Since R&D
programs are independent of one another, the environment is non-strategic and we can analyze
any firm’s decision by studying the optimal pattern of investment for a single representative
13The literature on licenses typically considers a monopolistic entity — a laboratory — which sells a patented
technology to a set of firms by making take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. By the same token, in the present case the pool
initiators — considered as a whole — are assumed to benefit from a monopolistic position when they sell outsiders
the right to enter the pool.
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firm. The maximum value function V of the firm’s program depends on the innovation state,
which can take values 0 or 1. In case of success, or state 1, the actualized value of a patent is
V (1) = v/r, where r is the common interest rate. In the absence of innovation, or state 0, the
actualized value V (0) of the firm’s R&D program verifies
rV (0) = max
x
[x (V (1)− V (0))− c (x)] . (2)
In the usual terminology, the latter Bellman equation says that the return r on the “asset” V (0)
is equal to the expected “capital gains” x(V (1)−V (0)) minus the flow of “dividends” c(x). The
first-order condition for an optimal level of R&D eﬀort implies that
V (0) = v/r − c0 (x) , (3)
where x is solution to
v − (x+ r) c0 (x) + c (x) = 0, (4)
as obtained by plugging (3) into (2).
The Formation of the Pool The pool is formed by the K first patentees, which thereby
gain two kinds of benefits. First, they make a higher return on their own patent, that is v¯, than
in the benchmark case. In addition, they extract some rent, that is a flow of profits v¯− v, from
any subsequent innovator interested in entering the pool. If we denote by VK(1) the actualized
value of being entitled with a patent at the date of pool formation, we have
VK(1) =
v¯
r
+
N −K
K
x
x+ r
v¯ − v
r
. (5)
The interpretation of the right-hand side of (5) is rather simple. The first term is the
actualized value of a patent that forms the pool and brings a flow of profits equal to v¯. The
second term reflects the fact that each of the potential N −K subsequent entrants contributes
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to the total pool value by a flow of rent equal to v¯ − v. The total flow is actualized (divided by
r), discounted by the “adjusted probability” of success of the R&D programs xx+r , and equally
divided among the K pool initiators.14 Remark that, after the formation of the pool, the R&D
decisions of all outsiders — the firms which have not patented yet and thus do not participate in
the pool — are the same as in the no-pool benchmark case. Each of them invests x, that is the
solution to (4), and the actualized value of each R&D program is as displayed in (3), that is
VK+1 (0) = v/r − c0(x). (6)
In other words, (6) is the value of not being among the K first patent holders. Remark that
VK(1) is increasing with the number of firms that remain outside the pool, with the latter firms’
optimal level of eﬀort, and with their adjusted probability of success, as one would expect.
A Recursive Formulation of the Race to the Pool We now concentrate on the period
starting at date 0 and finishing with the formation of the pool. This period is analogous to a
race in which the prize consists in being among the K first innovators, as this gives access to
a portion of the pool value. Equivalently, we choose to describe it hereafter as a series of K
successive patent races. The environment is now strategic because each firm’s expected return
from a patent depends on the achievement of other firms to be among the K first patentees,
and thus on their respective investments. This implies that the maximum value of a firm’s R&D
program is function not only of the innovation state (i.e., to be successful of not), but also of
the number of firms which already patented an innovation. As we assume that choices in R&D
14When the length of one period goes to infinity, the probability of success of the R&D program goes to 1.
However, time is costly and from the expected profit expression we can derive an “adjusted probability” of success.
Suppose that the stationary investment of the firm is x and the size of the reward in case of success is Π. Recalling
that x is the instantaneous probability of success of a Poisson process, the firm’s expected profit is
π =
Z +∞
0
xe−xte−rtΠdt =
x
x+ r
Π.
In words, everything happens as if by investing x the firm were instantaneously successful with probability xx+r .
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investments depend only on a current value relevant state, and firms are identical, we restrict
attention to Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria. Value functions can thus be indexed only
by the number of firms that have already patented an innovation or, equivalently, by the rank k
of the patent race in which a firm participates, with k ≤ N . Formally, by generalizing previous
notation, we denote by V ik (0) the actualized value of the research program( for firm i) that aims
at discovering the k-th innovation (when there exist k−1 patentees), and by V ik (1) the actualized
value of patenting in the k-th race (in which case there are k patentees).
When exactly k− 1 firms have patented an innovation, N − k+1 other firms keep investing
in an R&D program. Let us concentrate on one of these firms, we label i, in order to compute
its equilibrium strategy xi. Firm i’s R&D program can either be successful before others and
thus lead to an innovation of value V ik (1), or fail in patenting the k-th innovation and be valued
V ik+1(0).
15 It follows that the actualized value V ik (0) of firm i’s R&D program of rank k verifies
rV ik (0) = maxx
£
x(V ik (1)− V ik (0)) +Xj(V ik+1(0)− V ik (0))− c(x)
¤
, (7)
where Xj is the sum of the instantaneous R&D eﬀorts made by all other participating firms
j 6= i. In words, the latter displayed expression equates the return on the “asset” V ik (0) to the
expected “capital gains” minus “dividends”. In contrast to the no-pool benchmark case, here
capital gains can take two forms, depending on whether firm i innovates first or another firm j
gets ahead. The first-order condition leads to firm i’s optimal eﬀort strategy
xik =
¡
c0
¢−1 ¡V ik (1)− V ik (0)¢ . (8)
Now we may use the symmetry assumption to write V ik (1) = Vk(1), V
i
k (0) = Vk(0), and conse-
15When a firm participates in some race k and does not succeed in being the first to discover an innovation, it
initiates a new R&D program of rank k + 1. Accordingly, the actualized value of a program that fails to patent
the k-th innovation can be denoted by V ik+1(0). For k = N , we adopt the notational convention that V
i
N+1(0) = 0.
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quently xik = xk, for all i, with
xk =
¡
c0
¢−1
(Vk(1)− Vk(0)) . (9)
This leads us to transform (7) into
rVk(0) = xkc
0(xk) + (N − k)xk(Vk+1(0)− Vk(0))− c(xk). (10)
Finally, to characterize completely the value function associated with this game, we must
compute the value of patenting in the k-th race, that is Vk(1). This is done by observing that
during the k + 1-th race, that is in the period that follows the discovery of the k-th innovation,
and before the discovery of another innovation, each of the k patentees receives a flow of profits
equal to v. In the same period, the event that one of the “remaining” N − k firms succeeds in
patenting an innovation can occur with an “adjusted probability” of success of (N−k)xk+1r+(N−k)xk+1 , in
which case the actualized value of all patents at the issue of the race is equal to the value of
innovating at rank k + 1, that is Vk+1(1). Otherwise, all R&D programs fail with probability
r
r+(N−k)xk+1 , and the actualized value of each existing k patents remains equal to Vk(1). This
leads to
Vk(1) =
r
¡v
r
¢
+ (N − k)xk+1Vk+1(1)
r + (N − k)xk+1
. (11)
In other words, Vk(1) is the value of a lottery, in which a firm can gain
v
r with probability
r
r+(N−k)xk+1 , or Vk+1(1) with probability
(N−k)xk+1
r+(N−k)xk+1 . Monotonicity properties for Vk(1) as a
function of k appear in the next section, in which we characterize the solution of the dynamic
pool formation program.
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3 Equilibrium Pattern of R&D Eﬀorts
In this section we characterize the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria of the K races. The
two main properties we obtain in a first proposition are that equilibrium R&D eﬀorts (as made
by firms that have not innovated yet) are increasing with time as long as the pool is not formed,
and are always greater than the post pool-formation eﬀorts. These basic properties are ob-
tained through a series of lemmas which characterize the solution(s) of the recursive system as
formulated above.
Lemma 1 For all k ≤ K − 1:
v
r
< Vk(1) < Vk+1(1).
This says that the value of a patent increases as the rank k gets closer to the pool formation
rank K. Indeed, the reward accruing to a patentee which participates in the formation of the
pool is less discounted in race k + 1 than at rank k. Moreover, since owning one of the K first
patents gives access to a share of the pool’s profits on top of the flow of profits obtained in the
no pool situation, we have Vk(1) >
v
r .
Lemma 2
xK > x.
This claim becomes intuitive if one observes that, in the K-th patent race, firms have a last
chance to participate in the formation of the pool. This perspective encourages them to choose
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a more aggressive strategy than in the absence of hope to benefit from the pool’s profits. Exac-
erbated competition in this last race induces a higher eﬀort level than in the post pool-formation
period. The next lemma establishes the monotonicity of equilibrium investment eﬀorts.
Lemma 3 The two following properties are equivalent:
(i) xk < xk+1;
(ii) x < xk.
By combining those statements , we can now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 For all k ≤ K − 1:
x < xk < xk+1.
6
x
-
x
k
...
1 2 3 ... K − 1 K K + 1
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Figure 1: Pattern of Equilibrium R&D Eﬀort Levels.
Figure 1 summarizes the information given by this proposition on the equilibrium R&D eﬀort
levels of race participants.
In words, before the formation of the pool, race participants’ R&D eﬀorts increase with the
rank of the race. After the formation of the pool, outsiders’ R&D eﬀorts decrease drastically.
Proposition 1 characterizes the impact on R&D activity of the possibility given to firms to form
a patent pool of a given size K. Compared to a situation in which no pool can be formed,
the speed of innovation is higher before the formation of the pool (i.e., xk > x). By increasing
the prospective profits of a patent, the pool acts as an additional reward, and thus enhances
incentives to perform R&D. This simple result confirms in a formal way the general statement
by Lerner and Tirole (2004) that “the prospect of a pool raises individual profit and thereby
encourages innovation” (p. 705).
Another consequence of Proposition 1 is that, as the number of patents gets closer to the
pool formation level, successive races become increasingly tough, inducing the participants to
raise their level of eﬀort. This characterization is rooted in three distinct eﬀects.
In the k-th patent race, the number of participants is larger than in the k + 1-th race. It
is well known that in models à la Lee and Wilde, and under some stability conditions, this
enhanced competition should increase the equilibrium level of R&D for each firm. However, in
our model, this is counterbalanced by the two following eﬀects. Firstly, if a firm wins the k-th
race, then it waits longer for the formation of the pool than if it succeeds in patenting the k+1-th
innovation. Time being discounted, the reward is thus smaller in the k-th race. In addition, the
failure to innovate is less damaging in the k-th race than in the k + 1-th race. The reason is
that, at the lower rank, there is one more race to run before the formation of the pool, and thus
14
one additional chance to be among the K first patentees. The latter two eﬀects dominate the
first one (whatever the stability properties of the equilibrium), leading to xk < xk+1.
Remark that we did not address so far the question of the uniqueness of the solution to
the recursive system. Actually, it is not clear that the Bellman equation (7) has only one
symmetric solution, meaning that the diﬀerential game we consider may have several Symmetric
Markov Perfect Equilibria. However, Proposition 1 was proved without relying on uniqueness.
This means that our results are valid for all possible equilibria. In all equilibrium paths, race
participants’ R&D eﬀorts increase over time until pool formation.
An empirical implication can be derived from this first result. To see that, consider the
number of patent applications as a proxy for R&D intensity, in all industries in which a pool
was formed. These patents may be counted period by period (say, on a monthly basis). By
controlling for other R&D incentives, one expects the flow of technologically related patent
applications to increase over a time interval that precedes the formation of a pool, and to fall
at a lower level afterwards.
We end this section with a lemma that will be useful for subsequent analysis.
Lemma 4 For all k ≤ K:
Vk(0) > VK+1(0) =
v
r
− c0(x).
In more intuitive terms, this lemma says that the perspective of the formation of a pool increases
the potential value of an innovation, and thus also increases the value of all research programs.
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4 Size Eﬀects
We already know from Proposition 1 that, before the formation of a pool of given size K, firms’
R&D eﬀorts increase with the rank k of the race, with k ≤ K. In this section we want to analyze
the impact of the size of the pool K on the incentives to invest in R&D, and thus on the speed
of innovation. Because the perspective of a pool acts as a reward on investment, increasing the
pool size from K to K should a priori raise eﬀort levels that aim at patenting in races K to K,
all other things remaining equal. We will see with Proposition 2 that this is not the only impact
of an increased pool size, since this also results in a reduction of eﬀorts in the K first races.
As the proof of the results below make use of the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution to
the recursive system, we start by identifying the following mild suﬃcient condition.
Lemma 5 If c000 ≥ 0, there exists only one Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
From now on, we introduce the additional assumption that c000 ≥ 0.
Because we want to compare the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria we obtain by consid-
ering diﬀerent values of the pool size, we extend the previous notation by explicitly incorporating
K in the arguments of the value function and the eﬀort level. We now denote by Vk(1,K) (resp.
Vk(0,K)) the value associated with a patent (resp. a research program) when exactly k innova-
tions (resp. exactly k − 1 innovations) have been patented, and K patents are needed to form
a pool. The corresponding eﬀort level of the firms which participate in the k-th patent race is
xk(K).
Lemma 6 VK(1,K) is a strictly decreasing function of K.
This claim is derived directly from equation (5), and results from the fact that the value of
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participating in the formation of the pool gets lower if the size K increases, since the benefits
will be reduced — there will be less potential entrants from which to extract a rent — and will be
shared by a larger number of insiders.
Proposition 2 For two diﬀerent pool sizes, K < K, the equilibrium patterns of innovative
eﬀort levels verify:
(i) for k ≤ K, xk(K) > xk(K);
(ii) for k > K, xk(K) = xk(K) = x;
(iii) for K < k ≤ K, xk(K) > x = xk(K);
(iv) xK(K) > xK(K).
6
x
-
x
k
...
...
...
Size K
Size K
1 2 3 ... K K
Figure 2: Comparing Two Pool Sizes.
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In words, Proposition 2 oﬀers a complete comparison of equilibrium R&D eﬀort patterns as
obtained in the small and large pool cases: (i) establishes that race participants’ R&D eﬀorts
at each rank k in the small size case are higher than in the large size case; (ii) states that the
post pool-formation R&D eﬀorts of outsiders fall at the no-pool optimal level x for all pool sizes
(whereas pool initiators do not invest anymore); eventually, an increase in pool size implies a
prolongation of race participants’ equilibrium R&D eﬀorts, which according to (iii) are above
the no-pool optimal level, and from (iv) are below the final race level of a smaller sized pool.
All results given in Proposition 2 are summarized in Figure 2.
An interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that increasing the minimum size of the pool
dilutes the incentives to obtain the first patents, and thus decreases the equilibrium R&D eﬀorts
for the discovery of innovations. This important eﬀect is the consequence of three distinct
factors. First, patenting in the k-th race is more valuable if K is smaller because the discount
applied on the reward is smaller (the waiting time is shorter). Second, the reward itself is higher
for a smaller K because the pool’s profit pie is not only larger but also divided among a smaller
set of firms. Finally, the larger K, the less damaging a failure in the k-th race, since the number
of opportunities to belong to the set of pool initiators (that is, the number of subsequent races
K−k), as faced by an unsuccessful firm, increases with the minimum size of the pool. All three
factors contribute to the claim that, although unsuccessful firms have an incentive to increase
their R&D eﬀort successively from the first to the K-th race, a reduction in the size of the pool
implies higher levels of investment in each race.
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5 Pre Pool-Formation Incentives and Welfare Consequences
We can now use the results obtained in the previous sections to point to two distinct sources
of distortion. The first one aﬀects private benefits and originates from the pre pool-formation
incentives that drive firms’ R&D investment decisions. The second one impacts social welfare
and is rooted in the prospective orientation of the pool review process, as conducted by the
regulator.
Early Overinvestment in Innovation Consider for one moment the overall industry
acting as a single player and assume that the latter has control over the rank K and the vector
x =(x1, x2, ..., xN) of investment levels chosen by all firms , taken as a whole, as if they were
cooperating in R&D. This player will maximize the joint profits of the innovative firms. As the
eﬀect of the pool formation is to increase the value of innovations (from v to v), a simple revealed
preference argument leads to the conclusion that it cannot be worse oﬀ by choosing K = 1 than
any other pool size.16 The profits accruing to the industry for each innovation are then v/r and
the optimal investment level in each project is x, as implicitly defined by the first-order condition
v− (x+ r)c0(x)+ c(x) = 0. As c(.) is convex and v ≥ v, we have x ≥ x. This investment level is
also the one chosen independently by firms involved in an R&D program with expected return
v, as demonstrated in Section 2. We refer to the choice K = 1 and the levels x = (x, ..., x) as the
joint profit-maximizing strategy of the industry. By using this optimal strategy as a benchmark
for the assessment of firms’ behavior, we reach the conclusion that a pool formation process
induces firms to overinvest in the last innovations that are needed to form the pool. This occurs
because, in our model, being among the pool initiators is over-rewarded through the extraction
16The fact that one patent is suﬃcient to form a pool is one of our modelling assumptions and may be surprising.
Actually, one may consider that two (or more) patents are needed to form a pool. Our hypothesis provides a
rationale for considering v as the benchmark level.
19
of a rent from the firms that innovate after the formation of the pool. In particular, recall that
the private value of the K-th innovator is V (1,K) = ν¯r +
N−K
K
x
x+r
(ν¯−ν)
r , which is strictly greater
than v/r for all K < N . Formally, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 For all K < N :
xK(K) > x.
This says that the final race to the pool exhibits an overinvestment in innovation compared to
the joint profit-maximizing R&D level.17
It is of interest to link this new proposition to the research stream on multi-stage patent races
that concentrates on the cumulative nature of innovation. This literature is mainly concerned by
the problem of rewarding the early inventors for opening the way to subsequent improvements,
and generally insists on the insuﬃcient incentives given by patent protection. (See Green and
Scotchmer (1995), Chang (1995) or Matutes, Régibeau and Rockett (1996) for representative
contributions.) We find that a patent pool can be conceived as a means to increase the rewards
to early inventors, so long as it enhances their bargaining power when time comes to negotiate
the inclusion in the pool of new patents by subsequent innovators. Moreover, the idea that firms
may overinvest in R&D prior to the formation of the pool contrasts with the ex post antitrust
concern that firms may free ride on other pool participants’ discoveries, thereby leading to
suboptimal R&D investments. This may occur when a pool agreement stipulates the cross-
licensing of present as well as future patents (see the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (1995)).
17This echoes a well-known result obtained in another vein of the theoretical literature on R&D initiated
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). In the static models presented in these papers,
firms may choose R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively. When R&D spillovers are absent or low, they show
that non-cooperation leads to higher R&D levels than cooperation.
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Delayed Formation of the Pool From a social welfare viewpoint, the pool formation
process may also entail some form of distortion. To see this point, let us consider a measure of
the social welfare SW = SW (x,K). In equilibrium x = x(K), so that the variable K influences
the measure of social welfare in two ways, directly through its impact on the social value of an
innovation (this comes from the fact that the social value of an innovation may not be the same
whether its corresponding patent is in a pool or not), and indirectly through its impact on the
speed of the R&D process (i.e., the levels of investment). We now focus on the basic problem
of the regulator that consists in encouraging R&D in situations characterized by the following
property:
Property 1 ∂SW∂xi |x≤(x1(1),x2(2),...,xN (N)) > 0, for any i.
When the latter property is verified, the function SW is assumed to be increasing in xi, on
the domain relevant for our analysis, that is for all R&D investments that are lower than what
is possibly chosen by any firm in equilibrium. As all firms invest x at each point in time if no
pool may form, and xk > x for all k ≤ K otherwise, a direct implication of Property 1 is that
the social welfare is higher when the legal context gives firms the opportunity to participate in
the formation of a pool.
The decision to clear or not the formation of a pool is taken by the competition authorities.
Thus K is directly or indirectly fixed by the regulator. From an ex ante perspective, the socially
optimal choice of K by the regulator is captured by the maximization of SW (x(K),K). So if
the regulator were consulted at date 0 and could commit to a level K, it would choose the level
K that maximizes SW (x(K),K). Suppose now that social welfare, as a function of K, is such
that there exists a unique maximizer K and that, independently of other legal or institutional
provisions of all kinds, the review process specifies that the regulator is consulted by patent
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holders at some date, say k ≥ 0. At that point, the regulator can impose conditions (in our
model, it can impose a new size K > k) for the pool to be eventually cleared. We consider
all situations in which the regulator is consulted after date 0, that is when k − 1 innovations
have already been obtained with all firms anticipating the creation of a pool which includes
K patents, with 1 < k ≤ K. Then let the regulator perform a prospective analysis to select
a pool size K that maximizes the relevant social welfare function, which in this case writes
SW (x1(K), ..., xk−1(K), xk(K), ..., xN(K),K). If social welfare increases in each firm’s R&D
investment, this may result in a rise in the minimum pool size, that is in a choice of K > K.
In that case, if firms are suﬃciently rational to foresee accurately the formation of the pool, we
obtain that K will not be anticipated by firms.18 This reasoning is grounded on the following
formal result.
Proposition 4 If Property 1 is verified, then for all k < K < K:
SW (x(K),K) < SW (x1(K), ..., xk−1(K), xk(K), ..., xN(K),K).
In words, the latter inequality says that the (expectation taken at date 0 of the) social welfare
corresponding to a choice K = K is lower than the (expectation taken at date 0 of the) social
welfare obtained if firms anticipate K = K during the first k − 1 races before knowing that
K = K. This claim is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 (recall that xk(K) < xk(K) for all
k ≤ K < K) and Property 1. In intuitive terms, it says that if the acceptance/refusal decision
concerning a pool proposal is made on a purely prospective basis at date k, then it overlooks
the pre pool-formation incentive properties that drive firms’ choices of R&D investments. As a
18Arguably, the detailed treatment of past cases, as oﬀered by the DoJ Business Review Letters, together with
the related comments by business consultants and lawyers oﬀer suﬃcient guidance for firms to anticipate the
outcome of a pool review process from the outset (for example, see Morse (2002)).
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consequence, even if SW (x(K),K) < SW (x(K),K), it may be the case that, from k onward,
K eventually turns out to be the regulator’s best choice. This in turn restricts from below the
range of sizes K that can be anticipated by the pool candidates. As more time is needed to
obtain a larger number of patents, this will tend to delay the acceptance decision more than
what would be optimal from an ex ante perspective.19 The cleared pool size may actually be
larger than the K that maximizes SW (x(K),K).
These last results are consistent with the standard analysis of patents. In the more com-
mon situation of single patent attribution as well, the regulator has fewer motives to award a
monopoly power to an innovator ex post than in the pre innovation period, in which the nec-
essary incentives to perform R&D are taken into account. However, the case of patent pools
is more subtle, since some of their virtues (to coordinate the launch of a standard, to clear
blocking positions, to reduce transaction costs, to avoid costly infringement litigation), beyond
the exercise of monopoly power, can yield benefits to society also ex post. Consequently, the
regulator will not waver between the options to clear or not to clear the pool, but rather between
the options to clear it now or to clear it later.
6 Conclusion
Previous contributions to the emerging IO literature on patent pools have followed antitrust
practice in adopting the ex post perspective for reviewing pool proposals. We have adopted
the ex ante viewpoint to build a tractable dynamic model of multi-stage innovation, leading to
the formation of a pool, and which captures well documented stylized features. The pre pool-
19The business professional literature oﬀers anecdotal evidence that a pool review is a timely process, and that
law firms are aware of it. For a recent example, the 3G pool is based on a standard defined in 1999, but was given
clearance in 2002. Swidler Berlin Shereﬀ Friedman LLP (2003) argue that the pool review process “moved at a
glacial pace”, and that “the parties’ interests were harmed by having to wait three years to get a sign-oﬀ from
the DoJ” (p. 4).
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formation situation is described as a series of successive patent races leading to a prize, which
consists in founding the pool, and thereby in gaining access to a portion of the pool value. After
the formation of the pool, late innovators can integrate the pool only by negotiating entry with
the pool initiators.
As a result, the possibility of pooling of patents appears to have a positive impact on R&D
activity, in the sense that the speed of innovation is higher before the formation of the pool
than compared to a situation in which no pool can be formed. More precisely, as the number of
patents gets closer to the anticipated pool formation size, it is found that pool candidates raise
their level of eﬀort. A firm’s investment pattern is thus upward sloping over time before pool
formation, and decreases afterwards.
The analysis oﬀers also a complete comparison of equilibrium R&D eﬀort patterns for two
diﬀerent sizes of patent pools. The main insights are as follows: for a given rank in the innovation
series leading to the pool, a race participants’ R&D investment is higher in the small pool size
case than in the large size case; the post pool-formation R&D investment of outsiders falls at the
no-pool optimal level for all pool sizes; eventually, an increase in pool size implies a prolongation
of race participants’ equilibrium R&D investment below the final race level of a smaller sized
pool but above the no-pool optimal level. These results imply that an increase in the number of
innovations which are required to form a pool dilutes firms’ incentives to obtain the first patents,
and thus decreases the equilibrium R&D investments. This sheds light on the positive impact of
the possibility of forming a pool on firms’ innovative behavior, a feature that was hardly noticed
in the literature, and never investigated in a formal setup.
Eventually, our analysis points to two separate sources of distortions. They originate from
the characterization of private incentives as faced by firms in the pre pool-formation race, and
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from the prospective nature of the pool review process as conducted by the regulator. First,
we argue that, if the firms which innovate after the formation of the pool are not protected
enough against rent extraction by the pool initiators, then an overinvestment in R&D may
occur before the formation of the pool, followed by an underinvestment in all successive periods.
This complements the antitrust concern that, in the post pool-formation period, firms may
produce too little innovation eﬀort by free riding on other pool participants’ discoveries. As a
final result, we obtain that a cost-benefit analysis, as performed on a purely prospective basis,
gives the regulator an incentive to postpone a previously posted date of pool formation. This
time inconsistent behavior is likely to result in a larger pool size than the social optimum.
As the understanding of the role of patent pools on firms’ behavior is of some importance
for innovation and competition policy, more eﬀort is needed to investigate their impact on firms’
incentives to invest in R&D, resulting innovations, and welfare consequences. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to address these issues in a dynamic setup. Future work could
enrich the analysis by introducing changes in the assumptions. For example, one may consider
the cases in which the value of patents changes with the size of the pool instead of reaching a
high level that does not depend on the number of patents. Another interesting variation would
be to soften the assumption that pool initiators have full bargaining power, by specifying that
new entrants may obtain more in the pool than outside of it. This would test the robustness of
the obtained results to a larger set of specifications.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 The proof is immediate since we know from (5) that VK(1) >
v
r , and
from (11) that Vk(1) is a convex combination of
v
r and Vk+1(1). ¤
Proof of Lemma 2 To prove this lemma, remark first that the function v−rc0(x)+c(x)−
xc0(x) takes the value 0 at x and is decreasing in x (because c is convex). From (6),(9) and (10)
we can write
r
£
VK(1)− c0(xK)
¤
= −c(xK) + xKc0 (xK) + (N −K)xK
hv
r
− c0(x)− VK(1) + c0(xK)
i
,
which is equivalent to
r
h
VK(1)−
v
r
i
+ v + c(xK)− (r + xK)c0(xK) + (N −K)xK
h
VK(1)−
v
r
+ c0(x)− c0(xK)
i
= 0.
If we suppose that xK < x, then all the terms of this sum are (strictly) positive, which is
impossible. Hence we must have xK > x. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3 Let us start by proving that xk+1 < xk implies xk < x. By rewriting
(10) using (9), we have
r
£
Vk(1)− c0(xk)
¤
= xkc
0(xk) + (N − k)xk
£
Vk+1(1)− c0(xk+1)− Vk(1) + c0(xk)
¤
− c(xk). (12)
Moreover, we know from (11) that
−(N − k)xk+1 [Vk+1(1)− Vk(1)] + rVk(1) = v,
and Lemma 1 together with xk+1 < xk gives
−(N − k)xk [Vk+1(1)− Vk(1)] + c0(xk)− c0(xk+1) + rVk(1) < v.
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We can now rewrite (12) as
v − (r + xk)c0(xk) + c(xk) > 0,
which in turn implies xk < x. For the other implication, xk < x implies that −rc0(xk)+ c(xk)−
xkc0(xk) > −v = (N − k)xk+1(Vk+1(1)− Vk(1))− rVk(1), thus from (12) we have
(N − k)(xk+1 − xk) [Vk+1(1)− Vk(1)] + (N − k)xk
£
c0(xk+1)− c0(xk)
¤
< 0.
Then Lemma 1 implies that xk+1 < xk must be verified. ¤
Proof of Lemma 4 Assume that the weak inequality is verified for k + 1, and suppose
that Vk(0) ≤ vr − c0(x). Then from (10) we derive that v− rc0(x) ≥ −c(xk)+xkc0(xk), which is
impossible because xk > x. To conclude the proof, remark that the weak inequality is verified
at K + 1. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5 Define the function
F (xk) = rVk(1)− (r + xk) c0(xk) + c(xk)− (N − k)xk
£
Vk+1(1)− c0(xk+1)− Vk(1) + c0(xk)
¤
.
From (11) we obtain F (0) > 0, and if c000 ≥ 0 then F 00 < 0. Hence there exists only one xk such
that F (xk) = 0 (which corresponds to a solution of the Bellman equation). By iterating, we
demonstrate that there exists only one symmetric equilibrium path. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2 The points (ii) and (iii) are straightforward. Let us prove point
(i). Consider the case K = K. We know from equation (11) that
Vk+1(1,K)− Vk(1,K) =
r(Vk(1,K)− vr )
(N − k)xk+1(K)
,
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and replacing that into equation (12) gives
r
£
Vk (1,K)− c0 (xk (K))
¤
= −c (xk (K)) + xk(K)c0 (xk (K))
+ (N − k)xk (K)
"
r
¡
Vk(1,K)− vr
¢
(N − k)xk+1 (K)
− c0 (xk+1 (K)) + c0 (xk(K))
#
.
or equivalently
F (xk(K),K) = r
µ
1− xk(K)
xk+1(K)
¶³
Vk(1,K)−
v
r
´
+ v + c(xk(K)− xk(K)c0 (xk(K))
− rc0 (xk(K)) + (N − k)xk(K)
£
c0 (xk+1(K))− c0 (xk (K))
¤
= 0.
Now suppose that at stage k + 1 we have Vk+1(1,K) > Vk+1(1,K) and xk+1(K) > xk+1(K),
where K > K. Then from equation (11) we deduce that Vk(1,K) > Vk(1,K) because in the
K-case, we give more weight to the most valuable point in the convex combination and this
most valuable point is more valuable than in the K-case. From the definition of F , we also know
that F (xk(K),K) = 0 and F (0,K) > 0. Next, we can verify that because xk+1(K) > xk+1(K),
xk+1(K) > xk(K) and Vk(1,K) > Vk(1,K) >
v
r , we have F (xk(K),K) < 0. But then,
the intermediate value theorem together with the unicity of the Symmetric Markov Perfect
Equilibrium gives xk(K) > xk(K). The only thing that remains to be proved now is that
VK(1,K) > VK(1,K) and xK(K) > xK(K). The first point is a direct consequence of Lemma
1 and Lemma 6. For the second point it is useful to come back to the following expression
F (x,K) = rVk(1,K)− (r + x)c0(x) + c(x)− (N − k)x
£
Vk+1(0,K)− Vk(1,K) + c0(x)
¤
.
The function F defined in this way verifies F (0,K) > 0, F (xk(K),K) = F (xk(K),K) = 0.
Using the fact that VK(1,K) > VK(1,K) and VK+1(0,K) < VK+1(0,K) (which comes from
Lemma 4), we can deduce that F (xk(K),K) < 0. Again, the intermediate value theorem
together with the unicity of the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium gives xK(K) > xK(K),
as expected.
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Eventually, to prove (iv), consider the function F (x,K) = rVK(1,K) − (r + x)c0(x) +
c(x)− (N −K)x [VK+1(0,K)− VK(1,K) + c0(x)]. By definition F (xK(K),K) = 0 and we have
F (0,K) > 0. Consider K > K, we know from Lemma 6 that VK(1,K) > VK(1,K). Moreover
VK+1(0,K) = VK+1(0,K) and VK+1(0,K) − VK(1,K) + c0(x) < 0 (Lemma 4). Hence we have
F (xK(K),K) < 0. The intermediate value theorem together with the unicity of the Symmetric
Markov Perfect Equilibrium gives xK(K) < xK(K). This concludes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose xK ≤ x. We know that xK = (c0)−1(VK(1,K) −
VK(0,K)) and as (c0)−1 is increasing and VK(1,K) ≤ vr , this implies necessarily that VK(0,K) ≥
v
r−c0(x) or rVK(0,K) ≥ xc0(x−c(x). The hypothesis c00 > 0 and the starting assumption xK ≤ x
together give VK(0,K) ≥ xKc0(xK)− c(xK). But this is inconsistent with equation (10) because
VK+1(0,K) < VK(0,K). Thus xK > x. ¤
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